2 It is a conflict that pits the pharmaceutical companies against doctors, hospitals, insurers, regulators, and consumers. 3 The pharmaceutical industry has fought this war for over two decades, 4 but inevitably, it will lose because both facts and public opinion weigh in favor changing the status quo. 5 In this industry, life science HILL (Nov. 29, 2017, 10:46 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/362325-hhs-nominee-prescription-drug-prices-too-high [https://perma.cc/S443-C6FN] (quoting the opening statement of Alex Azar before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee).
2. Id. compliance officers have prepared for the confrontation for over twenty years. In this time, these officers have become vetted with unique knowledge and experience that will benefit all stakeholders. This is their Waterloo.
See Toon van der Gronde et al., Addressing the Challenge of High-Priced Prescription Drugs in the Era of Precision Medicine: A Systematic Review of Drug Life Cycles, Therapeutic Drug Markets and Regulatory Frameworks
The article will first discuss the pattern of prescription drug price increases from major pharmaceutical companies, the complexities of prescription drug pricing, and political responses to recent major cases involving drug pricing. 6 This is followed by a review of legislative solutions aimed to fix prescription drug price increases. 7 Finally, the article concludes by recommending tools that compliance officers can use to help regulate the price of pharmaceutical drugs. 8 
II. HOW DID IT GET THIS BAD?
As with most issues, the current drug pricing situation did not occur overnight. Rather, it progressed over many years. 9 For example, since 2013, the prices of many generic drugs rose sharply; in some cases by as much as 600% to 1,000%. 10 Over much of the past two decades, opinion polls and surveys have consistently shown that pharmaceutical companies are held in low esteem, on par with oil and gas companies. 11 The perceived arrogance of the industry has business/big-price-increase-for-tb-drug-is-rescinded.html [https://perma.cc/Y4GS-M4NP] (documenting public outcry causing a change in pricing by a pharmaceutical company). But see Max Nisen, Opinion, Why Pharma May Not Fear the Latest Drug-Price Probe, BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Aug. 18, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-08-18/biogen-and-pharma-ma y-not-fear-multiple-sclerosis-drug-price-probe [https://perma.cc/573Z-8EA7] (arguing that public outcry will not change the pharmaceutical industry's pricing practices).
6. See discussion infra Section II. 7. See discussion infra Section III. 8. See discussion infra Section IV. 11. See, e.g., Jim Norman, Americans' Views of Pharmaceutical Industry Take a Tumble, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185432/americansviews-pharmaceutical-industry-tumble.aspx?g_source=pharmaceutical+industry&g_ only served to strengthen the negative perceptions. 12 When coupled with rising healthcare costs that many people attribute to high drug prices, 13 the result is a rallying cry that American politicians find irresistible.
14 "A greater degree of government oversight is needed to defend public health" because the pharmaceutical industry is "controlled by economic managers who regard medicine simply as a business and who ignore human needs and responsibilities. 
A. Pattern of Prescription Drug Price Increases
A pattern of price increases can be seen across the pharmaceutical industry. For example, the drug Daranide was originally approved in 1958 to treat glaucoma and is now used to treat a rare illness called periodic paralysis. 16 Over the past seventeen years, the price of the drug has ranged from $0 to more than $13,000 for 100 pills. 17 The behavior of some pharmaceutical companies and their executives demonstrates the pricing problem. 18 For example, former hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli organized Turing Pharmaceuticals ("Turing") with the specific purpose to acquire and raise the price of older drugs. 19 In late August 2015, Turing procured the drug Daraprim from Impax Pharmaceuticals for $55 million and raised the price of the drug from $13.50 to $750-a 5,455% increase. 20 In the midst of the outrage over Turing's actions, Shkreli declared that the drug was priced where the company "could make a comfortable profit," and "that he had no plans to 16 
B. Complications of Drug Pricing
The pharmaceutical drug pricing system is a labyrinth of pricing mechanisms that ultimately leads to conflict. "Behind the seemingly simple act of buying a bottle of pills, a host of players-drug companies, pharmacies, insurers and pharmacy benefit managersare taking a cut of the profits, even as consumers are left to fend for themselves, critics say." 40 44 As a result, each side blames the other.
C. Political Responses
The Turing, Valeant, and Mylan cases have generated a predictable backlash and a flurry of activity by politicians. In 2017, United States Senators started pressing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate potential abuses of the Orphan Drug Act, 45 and President Trump demanded that the "artificially high price of drugs" be brought down "immediately." In 2018, the debate continues as pharmaceutical companies forge ahead, increasing the costs of drugs. 48 Examples of the ongoing pricing behavior include Allergan PLC's attempt to transfer a patent to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe (to take advantage of the group's status as a sovereign nation), 49 and Avondale Pharmaceutical's 800% price hike for a daily vitamin. 50 In reaction to the increases, states such as California, Louisiana, New York, and Nevada have successfully enacted price transparency laws, while Maryland has enacted an anti-price gouging law with a cost disclosure component. 51 With the exception of Louisiana and New York, the industry's trade groups continue to lobby against these regulatory measures. 52 One recent success for the lobbyists include the defeat of a Ohio ballot measure designed to allow the state to renegotiate drug prices. 53 Nevertheless, legislatures are beginning to enact measures to increase drug pricing transparency that will likely reveal that pricing decisions are neither rational nor methodical. Further, the United States Senate hearings on Gilead's pricing decision for Solvadi have already provided a glimpse behind the curtain. 54 Similar legislative efforts will likely continue to expose pricing methods contrary to public policy, which will leave the pharmaceutical manufacturers fighting a rearguard action against a tidal wave of regulatory efforts. Ultimately, the legislators, payers, and public will prevail in their effort to stabilize and reduce the price of prescription drugs. While there has been inaction at the federal level, there is a myriad of local initiatives and highly influential advocacy groups calling for transparency in drug pricing. 56 This landscape includes some of the "most powerful trade organizations," 57 spending near record amounts to affect change amidst a multitude of failing state legislative bills, 58 and new requirements that increase compliance risks at both the state and local level.
III. THE APPROACH OF THE STATES AND LOCALITIES

A. The Advocates Behind a Legislative Solution "86% of Americans support actions requiring drug companies to release information to the public on the process of setting drug prices"
59
The National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC) 60 and the Campaign for Sustainable Rx Pricing (CSRxP) are examples of affiliations that have provided aid to state legislatures with the goal of increasing transparency. 61 The CSRxP is a "nonpartisan coalition of organizations informing the debate on drug pricing and finding bipartisan, market-based solutions to lower drug prices in the U.S."
62
The CSRxP is not alone in its efforts with patient advocacy groups, (Feb. 17, 2016) , http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/laura-and-john-arnold-foundation-announces-7-2-million-in-grants-to-address-the-rising-cost-of-pharmaceutical-drugs/ [https:// perma.cc/AX2 Z-WJ39] (providing additional information related to other grants the foundation has given "for research and pilot projects aimed at addressing the rising cost of pharmaceutical drugs and reducing the financial barriers that can make it difficult to obtain life-saving treatments"). With the support of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, NASHP has also awarded grants of its own to beyond the strategies currently used in states to identify and develop new ideas which address the growing problem of Rx costs." 70 In October 2016, the PCWG issued a call to action to "[i]ncrease price transparency to create public visibility and accountability." 71 Part of this strategy included the following types of disclosure:
(1) Drug development cost reporting, requiring justification of price increases; (2) Public disclosure of price discounts and rebates to states; and (3) Confidential disclosure of price discounts and rebates to states.
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With PCWG's guidance, NASHP developed a model transparency bill blueprint for states that would require manufacturers to disclose how a drug is priced and publish price justification documents obtained from manufacturers. ) (describing NPA as "a non-partisan, non-profit organization" that "creates research and education programs that promote health and foster active engagement of physicians with their communities to achieve high Connecticut, 76 joined in the transparency effort with a white paper entitled "Curbing Unfair Drug Prices: A Primer for States," which provides various strategies for state legislatures to "rein in prescription drug prices."
77 Two of these strategies are for states to "pass laws that address unfair launch prices and price increases" and "pass legislation that mandates public release of as much information as possible about drug prices and development, manufacturing, and marketing costs on a drug-by-drug basis."
78
Many of these advocacy groups appear to be centered on the same reasoning-"[o]perating with transparency sends a message that there's nothing to hide."
79 Several of these entities also argue that a lack of transparency ultimately permits market participants such as pharmacy benefit managers ("PBMs") to engage in anticompetitve behavior, 80 such as kickbacks from drug manufacturers in exchange for exclusivity arrangements (that allegedly keep less expensive drugs off the market), as well as securing preferential rebates that are not passed on to patients. 81 quality, affordable health care for all").
76. About Us, UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FOUND.
OF Some researchers, however, challenge the notion that transparency is an effective remedy. They contend that the premise that disclosure curbs so-called "bad behavior" is based more on the public's negative perception of pharmaceutical companies and concerns over the mounting costs of healthcare, than on empirical research demonstrating the ability of money to change individual behavior. 82 Other researchers contend that disclosure alone is not the answer, suggesting that "disclosure is a sham; a way of deluding ourselves that we have cleansed the problem of conflict of interest and bias." 83 Many policymakers are also opposed to a transparency remedy. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has consistently expressed concern that pushing for disclosure might have the opposite effect and drive pharmaceutical prices higher. AB 1960's mandated disclosure of information may increase the cost of pharmaceuticals and health insurance premiums by attenuating competition between pharmaceutical companies and by raising the cost of generic substitution and clinical interchange. Any such cost increases are likely to undermine the ability of some consumers to obtain the pharmaceuticals and health insurance they need at a price they can afford. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n to Assembly Member Greg Aghazarian, (Sept. 7, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_ documents/ftc-comment-hon.greg-aghazarian-concerning-ca.b.1960-requiring-ph armacy-benefit-managers-make-disclosures-purchasers-and-prospective-purchasers /v04 0027.pdf [https://perma.cc/G52F-88V5].
Additional disclosure and contract responsibilities, including the imposition of a fiduciary duty on a PBM in certain of its dealings with pharmacies, are likely to increase administrative costs and legal liability Furthermore, while transparency is the most common remedy, the states, local governments, and local watchdog groups are adopting a mixed approach-combining disclosure, enforcement, and oversight (e.g., task forces)-in an effort to achieve the desired end goal of rational drug pricing.
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B. Explosive Growth of State and Local Legislative Initiatives
The elevation of Donald Trump to the White House, and the resulting gridlock in Washington, has made it increasingly unlikely that the federal government will take definitive action to address escalating drug prices in the near future.
86 Given the lack of action by the federal government, states and other local governments are promulgating their own rules and regulations. 92. See Fiorentino, supra note 58, at 2. There were two additional states that introduced cost transparency bills and five additional cost transparency bills in 2017 that were released after publication.
93. The legislation discussed below accounts for legislation targeting pharmaceutical manufacturers only. Id. Thus, legislation that would require pharmacy benefits managers to disclose rebates and similar type of legislation is excluded. Id.
is not just the volume of bills that is important, but the requirements they seek to impose on the industry.
C. The Categories of Pricing Legislation
In the last two years, the states' bills generally can be broken down into two main categories. The first is pricing transparency and the second, broadly speaking, is fair pricing (e.g., cost justification). 94 Within each of these two main categories there are 94. Berman et al., supra note 55, at 6-8. Chart 2 -Number of Congressional Cost Transparency Bills Introduced several unique state variants. 95 However, all the individual state proposals seem to start with a transparency component. 96 To get even more granular, within the pure transparency legislation camp, there are three main subgroups. The first subgroup, the Cost Reporting Bills, would require "manufacturers to file annual reports on the cost of the drugs." 97 "Costs" would include "research and development costs, costs of clinical trials and other regulatory costs, total costs for materials, manufacturing and administration of the drug, [and] costs associated with the drug's acquisition."
98 Manufacturers would also have to submit information on the "total marketing and advertising costs for the promotion of the drug directly to potential prescribers and consumers." 99 The second subgroup of bills, the Price Disclosure Via Advertising Bills, "would require all manufacturers to disclose the wholesale price of their drugs in any advertisement occurring within the state." 100 The third subgroup, "the Fine Print Cost Disclosure Bills, would require some type of disclosure, such as costly new drug notification . . . but also tack on additional requirements."
101 For example, the manufacturer might be responsible "for hiring independent auditors to verify the information in the report," or additional requirements "unrelated to price, such as pharmaceutical representative licensure."
102
In the fair pricing legislation camp, there are also three main subcategories of legislative initiatives. The first subcategory, the Cost Increase Notification & Reporting Bills, would require manufacturers planning to increase the costs of prescription drugs above a certain threshold to notify the state and payors (i.e., insurance companies) of a planned increase. 103 In addition, manufacturers would also need to provide "a justification report to the state and/or payors that 95 
D. Vermont Leads the Way
Vermont has a strong activist-history when it comes to targeting the pharmaceutical industry with laws, ranging from its unique gift ban to its disclosure law on spending with healthcare professionals and drug samples. 107 Vermont's pharmaceutical pricing legislation combines the elements of transparency with fair pricing and requires a state commission. 108 Under the Vermont variant, "a state entity or a commission would be responsible for creating a public list of prescription drugs, [and] require the manufacturer to report" to a state regulatory agency or commission. 109 The state agency or commission would also be responsible for submitting a public report to the legislature. 110 In addition to a price-marketing disclosure law, 111 Vermont now requires cost transparency for certain "high-cost" prescription drugs.
112 Vermont's Attorney General's Office (AGO) identified manufacturers who are required to justify the cost of certain prescription drugs, which the AGO will report to the legislature by December 1 of each year. 
E. California, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, and Nevada Follow Suit
California's Governor approved Senate Bill 17 in October 2017. 114 The law requires manufacturers of a prescription drug with a WAC of $40 or more for a thirty-day supply to provide written notification at least sixty days prior to any price increase to state purchasers, health plans or insurers, and PBMs, if the WAC's increase is at least 16%. 115 Manufacturers providing WAC increase notifications will also be required to report additional information quarterly, such as a description of the financial and nonfinancial factors that contributed to the increase, to the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). 116 Further, all manufacturers must notify OSHPD in writing before introducing a new prescription drug into the commercial market if the WAC exceeds a specified threshold. 117 In November 2017, OSHPD published its implementation plan. 118 Although the reporting requirements do not go into effect until 2019, 119 PhRMA has already challenged the law for constitutional violations. reporting is required, 122 there are no penalties attached for noncompliance. 123 Act 236 directs the BOP to develop a website that will allow prescribers to access prescription drug pricing information.
124
Act 236 also specifies, among other provisions, information the BOP will collect from manufacturers and how marketers may provide the required information.
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Maryland was successful in enacting a law prohibiting price gouging, which also contained a WAC disclosure component. 126 The state has focused its efforts on "essential off-patent or generic drug [s] ."
127 These drugs are defined as prescription drugs for which all exclusive marketing rights have expired. (1) an increase of 50% or more in the WAC within the previous year; or (2) an increase of 50% or more in the price paid by MAP in the previous year; and (3) either a thirty-day supply, full course of treatment, or the only available quantity that does not correspond to a thirtyday supply of an essential off-patent or generic drug would cost more than $80.
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Following a request from the Maryland Attorney General, manufacturers of these drugs would be required to submit a report within forty-five days of the request containing information such as the cost of production and reasons for the price increase. 132 Additionally, the attorney general was granted the authority to require the manufacturer to reimburse consumers, including a third-party payor, any money it acquired as a result of a price increase violation. the dormant commerce clause because it directly regulates the price of transactions that occur outside Maryland." 136 New York's transparency law, on the other hand, comes with a twist. 137 In the New York variant, the legislature established a Medicaid drug cap to address drug expenditures. 138 To address costs, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health (Commissioner) is responsible for setting a year-to-year Medicaid drug expenditure growth target. 139 Quarterly, the Department of Health and Division of the Budget must assess "the projected total amount to be expended in the year on a cash basis by the Medicaid program for each drug, and the projected annual amount of state funds Medicaid drug expenditures on a cash basis for all drugs" and submit a report to the Drug Utilization Review ("DUR") Board that provides, among other information, projected Medicaid drug expenditures. 140 In the event the expenditures from the previous 140. See id. § 280(3) (providing that the other information "includ[es] the amounts, in aggregate thereof, attributable to the net cost of: changes in the quarter indicate that the annual growth limit will be exceeded, the Commissioner can recommend that the drug(s) be referred to the DUR Board. 141 In turn the DUR Board will determine "whether a target supplemental Medicaid rebate should be paid by the manufacturer of the drug to the department and the target amount of the rebate."
142 If the DUR Board recommends a target rebate, the Commissioner will require the manufacturer to pay the supplemental rebate. 143 However, price reporting is triggered only if the manufacturer refuses to provide supplemental Medicaid rebates to the New York Department of Health. 144. See id. § 280(6)(a). Reporting would include the following: i) the actual cost of developing, manufacturing, producing (including the cost per dose of production), and distributing the drug; ii) research and development costs of the drug, including payments to predecessor entities conducting research and development, such as biotechnology companies, universities and medical schools, and private research institutions; iii) administrative, marketing, and advertising costs for the drug, apportioned by marketing activities that are directed to consumers, marketing activities that are directed to prescribers, and the total cost of all marketing and advertising that is directed primarily to consumers and prescribers in New York, including but not limited to prescriber detailing, copayment discount programs, and direct-toconsumer marketing; iv) the extent of utilization of the drug; v) prices for the drug that are charged to purchasers outside the United States; vi) prices charged to typical purchasers in the state, including but not limited to pharmacies, pharmacy chains, pharmacy wholesalers, or other direct purchasers; vii) the average rebates and discounts provided per payer type in the State; and Pharmaceuticals' costly cystic fibrosis drug, Orkambi, became the test case of the state's new law as the Department of Health unanimously voted to negotiate a rebate; the outcome remains to be seen and the company "plans to take a hard line". 145 The passage of Nevada's pricing transparency law, Senate Bill 539, is perhaps the best illustration of why the pharmaceutical manufacturers will ultimately lose this war. 146 In Nevada's case, a major union became a powerful force against the pharmaceutical industry. Nevada's Culinary Health Fund is a labor management trust fund that provides health benefits to approximately 55,000 workers and their 70,000 dependents in the Las Vegas area. 147 In an effort to contain rising health care costs for its members, the Culinary Health Fund contributed greatly to legislators advocating for the successful passage of SB 539. 148 While SB 539 contains numerous provisions targeting the pharmaceutical industry, the primary focus of the bill concerns pricing transparency of diabetes medication. 149 By February 1, 2018, the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services (NDHHS) must create a master list of all insulins and biguanides, and their corresponding WAC. 150 Using the list, NDHHS will then create a secondary list of those drugs with an increase in the WAC equal to or greater than the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index, Medical Care Component (CPI-M) from the previous year, or twice the CPI-M in the preceding two years. 151 Manufacturers named on the secondary list must file a report that contains information, such as drug production costs, manufacturer profit, and costs associated with coupons. 152 They also must state a rationale justifying the WAC increase.
153 Also, unlike the Vermont pricing legislation, any information that a manufacturer reports to the state is not considered a trade secret and can be disclosed to the public. 154 Currently, the pricing transparency provisions are the subject of a lawsuit filed by PhRMA and the Biotechnology Innovation Organization ("BIO"). 155 PhRMA and BIO contend that, among other things, SB 539 "interferes with the federal patent and trade-secret laws, deprives manufacturers of their property interest in their trade secrets, and improperly overrides the regulatory choices of every other state." 156 While it is unclear whether PhRMA and BIO will prevail, initial indications do not look promising. For example, the industry representatives failed to meet the burden for granting a temporary restraining order (TRO).
157 This is another clear indication that drug pricing transparency and fairness are topics that are not going away.
Additionally, states have begun to seek legal action to control drug costs. The Connecticut Attorney General's office launched an investigation, culminating in a coalition of forty-five states who brought suit, alleging that generic pharmaceutical companies engaged in price-fixing. 158 The multi-district litigation claims that generic pharmaceutical manufacturers provided incentives to large purchasers like McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health Inc., and AmerisourceBergen Corp., to keep prices artificially high. 159 To support the contention of price-fixing, the coalition cites the companies' 10-k and other regulatory filings required by the SEC, some of which contain troubling statements about the relationships between generic manufacturers and purchasers. 160 
IV. LEVERAGING COMPLIANCE
There are no easy answers to the dilemmas and trade-offs posed by the current need to curb rising healthcare costs, while continuing to find and produce new medicinal treatments. Ultimately, it will involve complex ethical decisions, pitting the value of life against the costs to achieve it. However, these issues are outside the scope of this article.
In the short term, for the pharmaceutical manufacturers facing an onslaught of pricing legislation, it comes down to trust, which is something that compliance professionals know a great deal about. 161 Compliance professionals also have the tools and processes to help companies demonstrate social responsibility and trustworthiness. 162 In other words, they have tools that will allow drug companies to demonstrate that they understand the "social contract" of their industry. 163 Finally, the tools that life science compliance professionals wield have been honed and tested successfully over the past two decades. 164 We believe that several of these tools can be effective in this situation as well.
A. Adopting a Voluntary Pricing Code
At the outset, we proposed that the industry create and adopt a voluntary pricing code. Companies have adopted these voluntary pricing codes. 165 In fact, several states have mandated compliance with the Code as a prerequisite for selling pharmaceuticals to their citizens. 166 Various executives within the industry have begun to call for what amounts to a voluntary pricing code. In September 2016, at the height of the Mylan EpiPen controversy, Brent Saunders called upon the industry to honor its unwritten social contract with patients. 167 After condemning "those outliers who have taken dramatic price increases-or engaged in what the public thinks of as price gouging," Saunders stated, "we must keep this social contract in mind as we make business decisions that ultimately improve wellbeing, and as a result, address the hopes others place in us." 168 To aid his company and other drug makers in making those business decisions, Saunders outlined five key activities:
(1) Pricing products based on the value they create, (2) Avoiding price gouging or predatory pricing, (3) Limiting price increases as to both frequency (once per year) and amount (slightly above the annual inflation rate), (4) Avoiding major price increases when products near patent expiration, and (5) Disclosing the impact of price on the company. 169 While not formally presented as such, Saunders' ideas, nevertheless, amount to the tenets of a de facto voluntary code. 170 CEOs do not constitute a trend, there seems to be a glimmer of recognition among pharmaceutical CEOs of the need to address price increases in a straight forward manner. 172 Creation and adoption of a voluntary code by the drug industry would constitute a substantial step towards defusing the current acrimonious environment. The National Academies agree that this is necessary as "[a]dvocacy for cooperation and collaboration is likely to be more productive when making recommendations that will require sacrifice across many components of the health care sector." 173 It also would be a step towards providing increased transparency to the system, which the National Academies consensus study supports and recommends. 174 
B. Standardizing the Price Setting Process
In addition to the creation and adoption of a voluntary code, we believe that another set of compliance tools-needs assessments and standard review processes-would help the industry address the ongoing perception that price increases are arbitrary. The recent examples of aggressive price increases have served to strengthen that perception. 175 If the industry critics and activists only had a few egregious examples to point to, it is unlikely that we would be seeing the sustained level of legislative activity at all levels of government. However, there is a more robust source that outlines the extent to which the pharmaceutical industry's pricing house is in disarray. 176 The Senate Finance Committee undertook an investigation on the pricing of Solvadi and its impact on the United States health care system. 177 Solvadi is a pill to treat Hepatitis C and is manufactured and marketed by Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Gilead). 178 Gilead priced Solvadi at $1,000 per pill, costing the average patient approximately $84,000. 179 Critics and physicians alike vilified Gilead for price gouging. 180 The Committee determined that the pricing decision for Solvadi was based on "setting the price such that it would not only maximize revenue, but also prepare the market for Harvoni [Solvadi's successor] and its even higher price." 181 Furthermore, the Committee concluded that "Gilead's goal throughout its pricing decision process appears to have been to identify the price just below the level where payors would place significant restrictions on patient access."
182 As a result, the company and its consultants developed multiple pricing scenarios to find that optimal level.
183
The elements that were not included in the pricing decision were just as important as those elements that were included. Based on the Committee's review:
Gilead acquired access to its sofosbuvir-based drugs through a multi-billion dollar acquisition and spent hundreds of millions of dollars more completing clinical trials and FDA approvals. While there were extensive discussions regarding return on those investments while Gilead was considering the acquisition of Pharmasset, there is scant evidence that return on these investments played a significant role in determining the pricing of these drugs. Similarly, the cost of manufacturing Sovaldi, which was nominal, played no part in establishing the price. In an interview, Gilead executive Jim Meyers, who played a lead part in making the pricing recommendation did not know the cost of manufacturing the drug.
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Therefore, it appears that traditional pricing rationales often touted by the pharmaceutical industry, such as recouping R&D and manufacturing costs while making a reasonable profit, were not at work in this situation. 185 While Solvadi is only one case study, it outlines perhaps the most significant challenge for the pharmaceutical industry when it comes to price-there is no standard price setting process. 186 This is where compliance can help. Less than ten years ago, the industry faced a similar situation in setting compensation for healthcare professionals, institutions, and organizations. While everyone got paid, most drug companies did not know what was paid each year by the type of service. 187 That changed with the government's increased anti-kickback enforcement efforts and the Physician's Payment Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act) that was part of the Affordable Care Act. 188 What emerged was a scripted process that began with a needs assessment and concluded with a cross-functional review session. 189 While the needs assessment document varies by company, "the important questions of 'why,' 'what,' and 'how' [are] a critical part of the needs assessment process in determining whether the proposed services fulfill a legitimate business need." 190 Although these needs assessments were originally developed in context of engaging the services of healthcare providers, we believe that using the needs assessment tools and techniques will work well for pricing decisions.
Using a needs assessment tool imposes rigor and enforces discipline. For the needs assessment to be adequate, all the necessary supporting information must be assembled and analyzed. 191 Moreover, a needs assessment process requires a disciplined approach that transcends the creation of the final, finished document. Therefore, if a needs assessment was integrated as part of the pricing determination process, companies would have basic information, such as R&D and manufacturing costs, and could avoid embarrassing "Jim Meyers" type situations or worse. 192 The same holds true for the cross-functional review session. Multidisciplinary team reviews are commonplace within pharmaceutical companies. 193 Consequently, the concept and operations of multi-disciplinary review teams are well-settled constructs.
In the case of a pricing review team, pharmaceutical companies will face the difficulty of determining team membership. Product pricing, as distinguished from the discipline of government pricing, is spread over many areas in most organizations. 194 However, most organizations will likely involve their compliance, legal, and finance officers. Beyond this core, including additional disciplines is a matter of organizational design and culture.
C. Managing Disclosure
Based on our review of the legislative landscape, mandatory pricing disclosure will continue to expand beyond the handful of states and local jurisdictions that presently require it. Also, absent an intensive and successful lobbying effort at the congressional level, preemptive relief-if there is any potential for it-is a long way off. Therefore, drug companies will face a myriad of price disclosure frameworks, at least in the near future. It is naïve to believe compliance can guide these various legislative regimens toward a meaningful disclosure frame. Rather, managing the overall disclosure process to minimize the impact on the company is a more realistic role for compliance. Once more, compliance officers have a great deal of experience with this. 195 Despite the existence of the federal Sunshine Act, there is no single, harmonized payment disclosure framework. While individual states cannot require separate disclosure of the same federal information, they are free to pursue and require the disclosure of additional information. 196 Therefore, states such as California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont, maintain their own separate disclosure schemes. 197 Pharmaceutical compliance officers and their departments routinely operate within this complex, tangled web of transparency requirements. In our estimation, their experience designing and deploying processes and technical solutions to meet various physician payment transparency requirements makes compliance officers ideally suited to address new pricing disclosure schemes. Pharmaceutical compliance officers could implement programs by employing the following steps currently used in Sunshine Act compliance:
(1) Determine what information needs to be gathered and locate the sources of that information; (2) Collect all the information and place it into some type of repository; (3) Develop and deploy tools to monitor completeness of the information and extract the data as required for each report; (4) Create the necessary quality control, review, and, if necessary, attestation process; and (5) Establish the necessary processes, complete with timelines for each succeeding round of reports. Although each step seems simple and obvious on its face, it requires an expert's knowledge of the laws and regulations, the industry, and the company's unique structures, systems, and processes to achieve success. This is where compliance officers excel.
V. CONCLUSION
As federal, state, and local governments cope with ever higher pharmaceutical prices that seem to defy logic and common sense, various state and local governments have seized the concept of pricing transparency to restore the missing balance. In doing so, they are discovering that pharmaceutical pricing is an extremely complicated and interdependent system of healthcare providers, payors, manufacturers, and patients. Governments continue to persist in their efforts after seeing a glimpse of the irrational world of drug pricing, knowing that current approaches are untenable. Likewise, the pharmaceutical industry continues to fight against the inevitable tide, arguing that regulators and the public do not need to understand how prices are set. Although arguing strenuously that additional legislation-including pricing transparency-is not the answer to rising costs, the pharmaceutical industry and its lobbyists fail to propose alternatives that attempt to meet the needs of all constituents. Therefore, without offering a plausible alternative, like physician payment transparency, pricing transparency will likely become a permanent fixture.
For industry compliance officers, coping with a radically new landscape is something which they are eminently familiar. With battle-tested experience and tools, the industry's compliance officers are best suited to demonstrate the value of compliance by helping their companies manage the new reality, while minimizing its disruptive impacts. They need to have the courage to step to the front of the line and lead.
